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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE C. LEWIS and
VERONA D. LEWIS
Plantiffs and Appellants

vs

Civil No. 7807

CLARA A. WHITE and
KATHRYN WHITE
Defendants and Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Iaw suit arises out of a contract dated May
1, 1949, (Exhibit ''A") wherein the Appellants
agreed to sell and convey a Motel near Pleasant Grove,
Utah, to the Respondents. Prior to the execution of
the contract the Appellant, Clyde C. Lewis, went to
Farmington, Utah, where the Respondents then lived,
and had two conversations with them. Upon the first
occasion he went with a Mr. Chidester, a real estate
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man, and on the second time he was accompanied by
Mrs. Lewis, the other Appellant (Tr. 47). Before
the contract \vas signed Respondents went to Pleasant
Grove and inspected the motel property, made inquiry
concerning the income therefrom and were shown
around by Mr. Lyons, who was in charge of the property for the Appellants. The Respondents saw the
motel property on Saturday before Easter and again
on Easter Sunday, 1949, which in that year was on
the 17th of April (Tr. 317 and 111). Respondents
took possession of the property on Sunday, May 1,
1949 (Tr. 322). Some payments were made on the
contract, but Respondents became delinquent in their
payments, and in May, 1950, the Appellants exercised
their rights under the contract by reason of the default of the Respondents and caused a notice of eviction to be served upon Respondents (Tr.107 and 116).
After termination of the contract and receiving the
notice of eviction, negotiations were had between the
parties which resulted in reinstating the contract by
payment of a sum in excess of One Thousand Six
Hundred and· no/100 ( $1,600.00) Dollars by Respondents ( Tr. 116) . Thereafter the Respondents
again became in default. Another notice of termination of contract was served on August, 17, 1950, at
which time they were in default on the contract in the
sum of One Thousand Seventy Eight and 36/100
($1,078.36) Dollars (Tr. 8). This action to recover
possession of the premises was commenced on the 17th
day of October, 1950 (R. 3). An Answer was filed
on the 17th day of November, 1950 (R. 5) and on the
26th day of March, 1951 (R. 10) an Amended AnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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swer and Counter Claim were filed wherein Respondents claimed damages for alleged false representations with respect to insulation, sewage and income
of the motel property, which allegations Appellants
denied in their reply.
The case was tried before the Honorable R. L.
Tucket and a Jury during the week of September 24,
1951. A special verdict was submitted to the jury
who found in favor of the Respondents on the Counter
Claim ( R. 34) . After the verdict had been returned
the Respondents offered to vacate the premises and
expressed a willingness to permit the treble damages
arising from unlawful detainer to be deducted from
the amount of damages on the Counter Claim (Tr.
410). The Court entered Findings and Judgment
accordingly (R. 36-41). The Appellants have appealed from that portion of the judgment against
them in the sum of Twenty Three Thousand Six Hundred F·orty Two and 04/100 ( $23,642.04) Dollars
(R. 44).
STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
WITH RESPECT TO THE REPRESENTATIONS.

POINT II.

RESPONDENTS DID NOT RELY
UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS
CLAIMED.
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POINT III.

RESPONDENTS HAD NO RIGHT
TO RELY UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS CLAIMED.

POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSlNG TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
RIGHT TO RELY.

POINT V.

THE FINDING OF THE JURY
THAT THE VALUE OF THE MOTEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00,
HAD IT BEEN ·AS REPRESENTED, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

POINT VI.

RESPONDENTS WAIVED
ACTION FOR FRAUD.

'
~

-

f

ANY

ARGUMEN'T
POINT I.

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED REPRESENTATIONS.

The Respondents claim false representations
with respect to the insulation, sewer and income of
the motel property ( R. 10). The claim with respect
to insulation was abandoned during the trail in that
the jury was not asked to make a finding thereon.· A
prima facie case was never made with respect to the
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claims regarding the sewer and insulation, for the
reason that Respondents never produced any evidence
of damage in connection therewith in that they failed
to show the value of the property had it been as they
claimed it was represented to be. Stuck v. Delta
Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791.
The case was tried on the basis of an alleged false
representation concerning income. Therefore, Appellants' argument will be confined to the alleged
representation concerning income.
POINT II.

RESPONDENTS DID NOT RELY
UPON THE REP:J1ESENTA'TIONS
CLAIMED.

The Court instructed the jury that before the
Respondents were 'entitled to recover upon their
Counter Claim the jury must find from the evidence,
among other things, that the Respondents relied upon
the truth of the statements made(R. 25). No.interrogatory was submitted to the jury on reliance, and
no finding thereon was made by the Court. However,
as we understand Rule No. 49, the Court is presumed
to have made such a finding. Appellants contend
that such finding, had one been made, is not supported
by the evidence. While it is true Respondents stated
on direct examination that they relied on the statement of the Plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, that the pro-·
perty had produced One Thousand and no/100
( $1,000.00) Dollars per month, yet their testimony
is no stronger than where it is left on cross examination. Oberg, v. Sapders, 111 Utah 507, 184 Pac, 2d
229.
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Appellants contend that the cross examination
of the Respondent, Clara White, shows that they did
not rely on the statement of Mr. Lewis as to the
amount of income the property had produced, but
that they relied upon his statement of how much income they could make from the property. When being questioned about her statement that Mr. Lewis
told her the property was bringing in One Thousand
and no/100 ( $1,000.00) Dollars per month she said,.
"I probably laughed at him" ( Tr.60). "I did not believe it till I was told over and over again" ( Tr. 60).
And upon being pressed further she said: "I did believe it, I did believe I could make that much" ( Tr.
61). This is further borne out by the following: , "I
did not know whether he was telling me the truth or
whether he was just kidding me about it. I did not
know" ( Tr. 61 and 62). He pursuaded me that I
could do that, so why did I refuse to believe it ... he
knew I could make it, knew I would make it" (Tr.
66). "The fact that I was told I would make $1,000.00
certainly would persuade me." (Tr. 67.)
POINT III

RESPONDENTS HAD NO RIGHT
TO RELY UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS CLAIMED.

If the Court for any reason is unable to accept
Appellants' contention that Respondents did not in
fact rely upon the representations, and believes that
the evidence shows that they did so rely, the Appellants earnestly contend, in any event, the Respondents
had no right to rely on said representations.
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One of the essential elements of fraud is the right
to rely upon- the representations. Stuck, vs. Delta
Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495,227 Pac.791.
This Court stated in Johnson, vs. Allen, 108 Utah,
148, 158 Pac. 2d 134 :
"It is fundamental that before anyone can
have relief from a claimed fraud he must show
not only that he relied upon the misrepresentation, but also that he had a right to rely on it."
The Court in the Stuck case, supra, also recognized
that the following quotations from text writers state
general rules with respect to right of reliance. The
following is an excerpt from Black on Recession and
Cancellation, Paragraph 113; found on page 796 of
227 Pac.:
''It is a rule of great antiquity, and supported
by a great body of authorities, that a person
about to enter into a contract or assume an obligation should exercise reasonable care and prudence in the matter of accepting at their face
value representations concerning the subjectmatter made to him by the opposite party; and,
although the representations were false and
fraudulent, and he was deceived by them and
misled to his injury, yet he cannot rescind or repudiate his contract on that ground, if it appears
that he might have discovered their falsity by
mere inspection of the subject, or by the exercise
of reasonable diligence in referring to sources of
information which were equally open to him as
to the other party.. There are exceptions to this
rule: ... Where a fiduciary relationship subsisted between the parties, where the matter was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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exclusively \vi thin the knowledge of one of them,
where an examination of the subject-matter
would require unusual pains, expense or trouble,
and involve special training or technical knowledge, and so on. But in the absence of such circumstances, the rule applies that, where the subject-matter of false representations is at hand,
and the truth easily ascertainable, one cannot
be heard to say that he had been defrauded by
such representations if he neglected to avail himself of a present and reasonable opportunity to
learn the truth."
·
On the same page this Court quoted from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) paragraph 892,
as to when a person is, or is not, justified in reliance:
" ( 1) When, before entering into the contract
or other transaction, he actually resorts to the
proper means of ascertaining the truth and verifying the statement; (2) when, having the opportunity of making such examination, he is
charged with knowledge which he necessarily
would have obtained if he had prosecuted it withdiligence; (3) when the representation is concerning generalities equally within the knowledge or means -of acquiring knowledge possessed
by both parties; ( 4) but when the representations concerning facts of which the party making it has, or is supposed to have, knowledge, and
the other party has no such advantage, and the
circumstances are not those described in the first
or second case, then it will be presumed that he
relied on the statement." _
The general rule is stated in an annotation in
174 A. L. R. at Page 1038 as follows,:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"If a purchaser makes a personal investigation which is free and unhampered and condi-tions are such that he must obtain the information he desires, he is presumed to reply upon his
own investigation rather than on representations made to him by his vendor."
A leading case wherein application of the rules
with respect to the right to rely upon representations
was made is Carpenter, vs. Hamilton, 62 Pac. 2d 1397
(Cal.) This was an action for fraud in the sale of
real property. The Plaintiff had judgrrient in the·
trial court which was reversed by the appellate court
on the ground that Plaintiff had no right to rely on
the alleged false representations. The following are
quotations from the opinion :
"But the right to rely upon the representations, of course, does not exist where a purchaser
chooses to inspect the property before purchase,
and, in making such inspection, learns the true
facts, for the obvious reason that he has not been
defrauded unless he has been misled, and he has
not been misled where he has acted with· actual
or imputed knowledge of the true facts. Ruhl,
vs. Mott, 120 Cal. 668, 53 P. 304; Gratz vs.
Schuler, 25 Cal. App. 117, 142 P. 899; Oppenheimer vs. Clunie, 142 Cal. 313, 75 P. 899.
" ( 4-9) Upon the question of knowledge it is
held, generally, that where one undertakes to
investigate the property involved or the truth of
the representations concerning it and proceeds
with the investigation without hindrance it will
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be considered that he went far enough with it
to be satisfied 'Yith what he learned. Mr. Pomeroy says, in speaking of one who has undertaken to make an inspection of the property,
"The plainest motives of expediency and of justice require that he should be charged with all
the knowledge which he might have obtained had
he pursued the inquiry to the end with diligence
and completeness. He cannot claim that he did
not learn the truth, and that he was misled." 2
Pomeory's Equity Jurisdprudence (3rd Ed.)
paragraph 893. "One ground of this latter
branch of the rule is the practical impossibility
in any judicial proceeding of ascertaining exactly how much knowledge the party obtained by
his inquiry; and the opportunity which a contrary rule would give to a party of repudiating
an agreement or other transaction fairly entered into, with which he had become dissatisfied."
Id. If it fairly appears from the evidence that
the buyer undertook to investigate for himself
the matters as to which representations had been
made, he cannot be allowed to later claim that he
acted upon the representations, even though he
voluntarily abandoned his investigation before
it was completed."
"But there is another reason why the charge
of fraud must fail. Having inspected the property to be purchased with ample time and opportunity to judge of its condition, they must be
charged with knowledge of what they learned
and what they would have learned in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. They may
not deny knowledge of facts which would have
been known to them but for their negligence. It
is to be conceded that if they had made no examination of the property defendant could no.t exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cuse his fraud by the plea that plaintiffs were
negligent in believing what he said and in failing to make an independent investigation, but
having undertaken the inquiry, plaintiffs were
obliged to look with seeing eyes. When the inspection was over, they could not excuse their
ignorance of what they should have seen by
pleading the superficial character of their examination.''
"It might have caused Plaintiffs some inconvenience to make an examination of the foundation or of the roofs, or to em ploy some one to
make the examination for them, but they could
not otherwise have learned of the existing conditions. The duty of a purchaser who has undertaken to make an inspection is not limited to
doing the things he m'ay find to be convenient.
The difficulties which plaintiffs have pointed out,
if they could be properly so called, were not such
obstacles as would excuse them from making a
complete investigation. All of the means of
knowledge were at hand. The true condition of
the buildings was before them. If they neglected
to discover what was in plain sight, the law will
nevertheless charge them with knowledge of
what they should have discovered. They cannot
deny knowledge of the patent defects which
existed in the parts of the buildings which they
did examine. Having knowledge of the falsity
of some of the representations, they had no right
to rely upon others. The rule is universally recognized in fraud cases that where the buyer is
aware of suspicious circumstances or has learned of the falsity of one or more of the represenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tations he is under a legal duty to make a complete investigation and may not rely upon the
statements of the seller." (Emphasis ours.)
The Court held as a matter of law in the Carpenter case, supra, that Plaintiff did not rely upon
the representations. Appellants contend that the
rules set out above are applicable to the case at bar
and the Respondents in this case had no right to rely
upon the representations claimed.
Before the contract was executed Respondents
went to the motel property upon two occasions, made
an inspection of the same and made inquiry of Mr.
Lyons who was in charge concerning the income. Mrs.
White relates her conversation with Mr. Lyons as follows: "The income there at that time, he told me
there was seven men there and that they were each
paying two and a half a day" ( Tr. 50.). According
to Mr. Lyons, he told her there were nine permanent
guests paying $7.00 per week (Tr. 318). On a monthly basis the income, according to Mrs. White's testimony, was $525.00, and according to Mr. Lyon's testimony was $270.00. There is no evidence in the record that Respondents made any other or further inquiry concerni_ng the income of the property. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that the Respondents
were most indifferent to the matter. They knew there
was a receipt book, but they never asked to se it (Tr.
74, 76). Thy knew a Miss Carruth had operated the
property for a year prior to that time ( Tr. 50), but
they never asked Mr. or Mrs. Lewis how to get in
touch with Miss Carruth. They never inquired of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Lyons how to reach ·Miss Carruth ( Tr. 80). When
asked by counsel if she was not interested in talking
with Miss Carruth Mrs. White shrugged her
shoulders and said: "I had no reason to talk to her."
"I was not interested in asking her how much she
made" ( Tr. 80). Respondents testified Mr. Lewis
told them the place was producing One Thousand and
noll 00 ( $1,000.00) Dollars per month, and that Miss
Carruth had made One Thousand and no/100
( $1,000.00) Dollars per month. Subsequent to this,
however, Respondents made their own investigation
of the matter and according to Respondents' evidence
learned the property was producing a little over onehalf the amount represented. This is a clear case for
application of the rule of the Carpenter case, supra.
There is no evidence that Appellants used any artifice or deception or tried to conceal anything from
the Respondents and there was no fiduciary relation
between the parties. The Respondents were notrequired to make an investigation, but under all of the
authorities, having chosen to inspect the property and
make an investigation concering the income, they are
charged with the knowledge of what they learned,
and what they would have learned in the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence, and should have made
a complete investigation.
As the Court observed in the Carpenter case,
supra, if the Respondents undertook to investigate
for themselves, and upon doing so obtained information that the place was producing approximately half
the amount they testified to having. been told it was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

::
~
~

17
making, they can not be allowed to claim that they
relied and acted upon the representations. Under
the authorities cited such information which they did
obtain, about the income, \vas such that they were
under the legal duty to make a complete investigation
and can not rely upon any of the statements of the
Appellants. The facts in the case at bar "leads to a single tenable conclusion" that the Respondents had no
right to rely on the representations. The matter then
becomes a question of law, as in the CarpeRter case,
supra. Therefore the Court erred in denying Appellants' motion for a directed verdict and the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed.
POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
RIGHT TO RELY.

That the right to rely on the representations is
an essential element of fraud, has already been emphasized. Appellants have also urged that the evidence that Respondents did not rely upon the representations is so strong in this case as to require this
Court, as a matter of law, to reverse the judgment
of the trial Court. However, should the views of this
court be at variance with those expressed herein, then
Appellants conten-d that in any event it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the
jury regarding the right to rely.
The general rule, as supported by the case of
Stanley Fruit Co. vs. Elery, 22 Pac. 2d 672 (Ariz.),
is that when justified by the pleadings and. eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence instructions should be given concerning the
right to rely. Respondents alleged in their Counter
Claim that they relied upon the representations of
the Appellants, which allegation was denied by Appellants in their Reply. As heretofore pointed out,
the evidence so far as Appellants are concerned admits of only one conclusion, that is, that Respondents
did not rely, or have the right to rely on the representations. However, should such view of the evidence
not be accepted, wit~ such evidence as there is in the
record on the question of reliance, the Trial Court
certainly should have instructed the jury on the right
to rely. Appellants requested the Court to so instruct
the jury (Requested Instruction No. 3, R. 19) and
Appellants properly took exception to the refusal of
the Court to give such instruction (Tr. 408). Appellants were prej:udiced thereby in that they were precluded from arguing this matter to the jury and the
jury was deprived of the guidance of the Court's in- struction in making its determination of the issues
presented. Such was prejudicial error, and therefore Appellants' motion for a new trial should have
been gran ted.
POINT V.

THE FINDING OF THE JURY
THAT THE VALUE OF THE MOTEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00,
HAD IT BEEN AS REPRESENTED,
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The Respondents called Lawrence M. Atwood,
Thomas H. Heal and Ralph Halm, for the purpose
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of proving value. In order to fix the value of the property as it was at the time of purchase the witnesses
were asked to assume that it had a gross income of
Three Hundred Fifty and no/100 ( $350.00) Dollars
per month, and based on that and their examination
of the property they gave their opinion as to its value
(Tr. 147, 171, 241), and the jury fixed the value at
$14,000.00. Then the witnesses were asked to assume
that the property had a gross income of $1,000.00 per
month, and based upon that assumption they gave
their opinion as to the value. The following is an excerpt from the testimony of Mr Heal: "Q. Now from
your examination of this property, and assuming that
on and just prior to May 1, 1949, the property was
producing a gross income of approximately $350.00 a
month, have you an opinion as to what would be, or
what was the reasonable market value of that property on May 1, 1949, including the furnishings in that
property? A. Yes, sir. "Q. All right, what is your opinion? A $14,166.00. ~'Q. Now assuming that the property on May 1, 1949, was producing an income of
$1,000.00 per month, have you an opinion as to what
would be the reasonable market value of that property
as of May 1, 1949, with such an income as $1,000.00
per month?" To which the witness answered
$42,500.00 (Tr. 171, 172).
The same pattern was followed in the case of
Mr. Atwood ( Tr. 148) and Mr. Halm ( Tr. 242).
Upon that evidence the jury found the property
would have had a value of $42,000.00 were the income
as Respondents claimed it had been represented to
be. Appellants contend such a finding is not supported by the evidence.
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The witnesses were not askedto consider the elements of sewage and insulation in determining the
value of the property as represented. The question
put to them in each case was based on the assumption of one thing only, that is, the gross inco~e of
$1,000.00 per month. In other words, they were asked to fix value by capitalizing the gross income. This
is an improper method of determining the value of
property. One of the best authorities in support of
this point is the case of DeFreitas, vs. Town of Suisun, 149 Pac. 553 (Cal.). This was an action for
damages to real property occasioned by reason of
the fact that the Defendant had dug a tunnel, thereby
diverting underground water which supplied Plaintiffs' springs and caused the same to become dry,
thereby depriving Plaintiffs of the water belonging
to their land. The jury brought in a verdict for the
Plaintiffs for the sum of $4,000.00 damages. The following question was put to one of the witnesses:
"Conceding that the town of Suisun dug the
tunnel and struck the main flow of water at the
end of the tunnel about the 8th of September,
1908; that prior to that date there were springs
on plantiffs' land, the waters of which, plantiff
had used to irrigate a part of the land; that by
reason of such irrigation, Mr. Freitas could
and did cultivate strawberries, blackberries,
raspberries and vegetables on that part of said
land; that Mr. Freitas took off and received
therefrom a gross income of $1,200 a year, average, and from the unirriga ted portions thereof
a gross average· income of $600, and taking into
consideration that this was outside of the quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of having a living from the place, using
'Yhat 'Yas there-now, under these circumstances, 'Yhat would have been in your estimate,
the v-alue of that whole piece of property, the
50 acres, giving the value of the irrigated and
the unirrigated ground separately?"
To this the 'vi tness answered :
"Well, from grounds that produced a gross
income of $1,200 a year I should say from
$8,000 to $10,000; the balance producing a
gross income of $600 I should say it would be
worth from $4,000 to $5,000."
"The witness was then asked what the damage would be to the land if the town tunnel had
dried up the springs formerly supplying Freitas'
land, and permanently deprived it of the use of
all that water for irrigating purposes, whereby
the gross annual income of that irrigated land
had been reduced to $200.00. The witness answered that the loss would be from $6,000 to
$8,000. On cross-examination the witness stated
that he based his estimates of value on gross income, deducting one-half for expenses of production and allowing 6 per centum interest on
the investment. In other words, he capitalized
the gross income of $1,200, less one-half for expenditures. He also testified that he knew nothing of the actual yield of the land or of the expenses of growing, harvesting, and marketing
the crops produced from it. The defendant
moved to strike out all the testimony of Gordon
as to value and damage on the ground that he
was not qualified to speak as an expert on the
value of the Freitas place. The motion was denied.
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"The facts stated in the question gave no proper basis for an estimate of value. Gross income
does not determine value. It might be all used
up in expenses, in which case upon the theory
proposed, the land would be worthless, although
its actual market value might be considerable.
The witness had no knowledge of the expenses
of production. His allowance of one-half was
purely arbitrary, and there was no evidence to
sustain it. Other evidence produced in defense
tended to show that such expense was far more
than one-half of the gross receipts. Moreover,
if it were the law that the value is to be ascertained by the mere capitalization of the net revenue, the evidence should be confined to proof
of facts showing the net revenue. That being
ascertained, the value would not be a question
for an expert, but a mere question of mathematics, a calculation which the court should
make or direct the jury to make. The truth is
the amount of actual net revenue does not determine the value of land in every case. The revenue would vary according to the industry,
skill, and wisdom of the person cultivating the
land. Its net revenue, assuming reasonable skill
in cultivation and management, would be the
criterion, so far as that element alone is concerned. But other elements, such as the state
of the market, the demand and supply of land
of the character in question, the prospects of advance, and perhaps other things, would ordinarily affect the question of value and- fix it at a
sum different from that produced by capitalizatjon of net revenue. The actual market value is
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the thing to be determined, and while net revenue should be considered, it does not, in general
furnish a conclusive measure of such market
value. In the present case, however, the questions, both as to value and damage, were framed
upon the erroneous theory that value may be detern1ined from gross revenue alone, and neither
of them should have been allowed." (Emphasis
ours.)
The principle of the DeFreitas case (supra) was
the basis of the holding in Revis, vs. Chapman & Co., ·
19 Pac. 2d 511 (Cal.).
This principle is further supported by practically unanimous authority in condemnation cases.
The author of the annotation in 7 A. L.- R. 163, 164,
says:
"Evidence of profits of a business conducted
on property is too speculative, uncertain andremote to be considered as a basis for computing
or ascertaining market value of the property in
condemnation proceedings.''
The following is also a statement from Jones on
Evidence, Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged,
Vol. 2, Page 1311:
"The authorities are practically unanimous
in this country to the effect that evidence of profits derived from a business conducted on property which is sought to be condemned is too
speculative, uncertain and remote to be considered as a basis for computing or ascertaining
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the market value of property within the intent
and purpose of such proceedings."
There is no reason why the rule in condemnation
cases should be any different from the case at bar.
The objections to the m.ethod of fixing value, as
pointed out in the above authorities, are applicable
to the case at bar. There is no evidence in the record of the cost of operation to produce the income of
$1,000.00 per month. As pointed out in the DeFreitas case, supra, it might all be used up in expenses.
·The revenue would vary according to the industry,
skill and wisdom of the person operating the motel.
Likewise, other things such as the state of the market,
supply and demand would enter in, so that according
to the DeFreitas case, neither gross nor net income is
sufficient upon which to fix value.
The witnesses Atwood and Heal arrived at the
figure of $42,500.00 on the theory that the market
value of the property increased in direct proportion
to the increase of gross income (Tr. 148, 194, 195).
Mr. Halm followed this same formula, except that
he made some allowance for the type of construction
( Tr. 241). It is obvious that such a method of arriving at value is fallactious. This can be illustrated
by the following example: Suppose two motels, with
the same ·size and number of rooms, were built side
by side at the same time. One was built of cheap material, at a cost of $14,000.00 and the other of fine
materials, at a cost of $42,000.00. The gross income
from the cheap motel was about one-third that of
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the better motel. Then suppose the management of
the cheap motel changed its policy, put on an extensive advertising can1 paign and furnished a floor show
for the guests each night, and by doing so increased
the gross income so that it was equal to that of the
better motel. It "·ould be absurd to say that by doing
so the market value of the cheap motel had been increased to equal that of the better motel.
This Court has announced that the measure of
damages in fraud cases in this State is the so-called
"benefit of the bargain" rule. Hecht, vs. Metzler, 14
Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37; Kinnear, vs. Prows, 81 Utah
135, 16 Pac. 2d 1094, which is, that the injured person is allowed the difference between the actual value
of the property and its value if it had been as represented. This rule is fairly simple of application when
some tangible aspect of the property is involved. To
illustrate, if the motel had been represented to have
a copper lifetime roof, and it actually had a tar paper
roof, the difference in value could be readily ascertained. In such case there would be a variation in
the structure itself, and its value would be one figure
with one type of roof and another figure with the
other type of roof. But the inapplicability of such
measure of damages is obvious when the variation is
not in the structure of the property itself, but in the
gross income only. Where the gross income alon'e is
varied there is no variation in the structure itself.
Without a variation in the structure it is difficult to
see how there can be any variation in its market
value.
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In the final analysis there is no question but
what the Respondents got the exact property which
they inspected and which was the subject of the contract between the parties. If the property had had
a gross income of $1,000.00 per month it would still
have been identically the same property, and its value
no different. Appellants contend therefore that the
finding of the jury of $42,000.00 as the value of the
property had it been as represented is not supported
by the evidence; that the measure of damages used
is not applicable and that Respondents have shown
no damage and therefore App_ellants' Motion for a
directed verdict should have been granted.
POINT VI.

RESPONDENTS WAIVED ANY
ACTION FOR FRAUD.

- The undisputed evidence in this case which came
from the Respondents themselves, to which no objection was made, shows that Respondents have
waived a right of action for fraud. Respondents took
possession of the property on May 1, 1949'(Tr. 322).
During the year following some money was paid on
the contract by Respondents, but Respondents got
behind in their payments and a notice of eviction was
served. upon them ( Tr. 116) . Thereafter negotiations were had between the parties and their attorneys for the purpose of permitting the Respondents
to remain in possession of and pay for the property.
Mrs. White testified: "I went to the office (Mr. Jensen's) and tried to fix things with him and let me
have a chance to pay up" ( Tr. 107) . "I tried to get
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him (Mr.Jensen) toletmepayitthatway" ($100.00
a week Tr. 108). On redirect examination, and in
response to a question by her attorney, Mrs. White
testified about the conversation with respect to paying $100.00 a week as follows: "It was after I got
the notice of eviction and I went down to Salt Lake
a purpose to see Mr. Jensen or Mr. Lewis, whichever
I could see. I saw Mr. Jensen and I tried to talk to
him, get him to do something, give me some way of
paying that so that I could wait until I got my house
full enough. The boys were coming back I was told
and I tried to get him to wait."
After these negotiations Mrs. White raised the
sum of $1,694.14 and through her attorney, Mr. Dalton, paid that sum to Appellants, which was accepted
by the Appellants through their attorney for the purpose of reinstating the contract. On June 12, 1950,
a receipt was issued by Mr. Jensen, attorney for Appellants, for said sum, which recites as follows: "Reinstatement of contract of Clara A. White and
Kathryn Grange White with Clyde C. Lewis, for purchase of motel at Pleasant Grove." (Defendants' Exhibit 3).
At the time of these negotiations and reinstatement of the contract Respondents had been in possession of the property for more than a year. The
evidence shows that they took in about $130.00 from
transients during the first year, and that they had
an average of four roomers who paid $10.00 per week
each for a room ( Tr. 54-55) . Their gross income
from the property other than from board furnished
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to some roomers, was less than $200.00 per month.
It is obvious that from the first month they were in
possession they knew the alleged representations regarding income were false. Likewise Respondents
claimed to have had trouble with the sewer commencing with the day after they moved in ( Tr. 305).
If the place was not well insulated it was quite unlikely they could have lived in the premises for a year,
especially during the winter, without becoming
aware of the lack of insulation. If there were any
false representations made Respondents had discovered the falsity thereof before the negotiations for,
and ultimate reinstatement of the contract.
As to the timeliness of the discovery of fraud in
a case much like the one at bar, in that it involved
representations of the income of a hotel, is the leading case of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer, 48 Pac. 54 (Cal.),
which will be referred to hereafter, wherein the
Court said:
"The Appellants took possession of the premises on the first of January, 1894; and, if the
Respondents made the representation alleged,
the falsity of that representation must have been
discovered ... immediately after the Plaintiffs
took possession."
The authorities sustain the proposition that the negotiations set out above and reinstatement of the contract after Respondents had discovered the alleged
fraud, amount to a waiver thereof. As mentioned
above, one of the leading cases which is very similar
to the case at bar in support of this proposition is
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Schmidt, vs. Mesmer, supra. The gist of the Complaint 'vas that the Defendant had falsely represented the income of the hotel for the previous year to be
$750.00 per month, whereas in truth it was. only
$350.00 per month. The Court stated the rule as follo\YS:

"If, after his knowledge of what he claims to
have been the fraud, he elects not to rescind, but
to adopt the contract and sue for damages, he
must stand toward the other party at arm's
length; he must, on his part, comply with the
terms of the contract; he must not ask favors of
the other party, or offer to perform the contract
on conditions which he has no right to exact,
and must not make any new agreement or engagement representing it; otherwise he waives
the alleged fraud.''
Mter citing several authorities the Court concluded
as follows:
"Under the foregoing authorities, and upon
principle, we think that the acts of the appellants in the case at bar constitute a waiver of
the alleged fraud, and an abandonment of the
suit for damages. After the expiration of more
than a year subsequent to their knowledge of
the alleged fraud, they ask to have the rent reduced, without any intimation of the alleged
fraudulent conduct of the respondent. Subsequent to that time they solicited and obtained an
extension of the time for the payment of the rent,
still without any intimation of the alleged fraud;
and they themselves have failed to comply with
their part of the contract, by failing to pay the
rent as provided therein. This conduct of the
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appellants clearly brings them within the princii?le d~clared in the authorities above cited, and,
this being so, the alleged errors of the court, with
respect to other matters, become immaterial."
The Court held in the case of Hough, vs. Ferguson, 171 Pac. 804 (Cal.) that where the Defendants lived on the property for many months, and
being in default in their payments on the mortgage,
applied to the Plaintiffs for, and received extensions
of time on such payments, that by doing so, after they
had knowledge of the alleged falsity of the representations, they were precluded from later raising the
question of fraud.
The California courts have continuously affirmed the doctrine of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer. In the case
of Tucker, vs. Beneke, 182 Pac. 299 (Cal.) it was
held that a request for and obtaining of an extensiori
of time on the mortgage amounted to a waiver of
fraud under the case of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer. A similar case is that of Monahan, vs. Watson, 214 Pac.
1001 (Cal.). This was an action on a promissory note
given in payment of personal property. The s~ller
and holder of the note instructed his attorney to collect it upon maturity. Three or four days before the
due date the Buyer called at the attorney's office and
requested an extension of time for thirty days, which
was granted by the attorney. It was held that such
was a waiver of alleged fraud in the sale of the property for which the note had been given. The Court
cited Schmidt, vs. Mesmer.
Another case where the facts are similar to the
case at bar is Tuttle, vs. Stovall, 67 S. E. 806 (Ga.).
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In this case the plaintiff had purchased from the Defendants some furniture which had been used by Defendants in the operation of a hotel. The contract
price was $2,125.00; $700.00 of which was paid in
cash at the time of the execution of the contract and
notes taken for the balance. One note for $500.00,
due on Septem.ber 5, 1908, was paid at about that
time. Another note for $500.00 was due on-January
5, 1909. On January 8, 1909, the Plaintiff paid
$200.00 on the latter note and took from the Defendant a writing acknowledging receipt of the note
agreeing "to indulge her for thirty days to pay the
balance of the note." The Plaintiff claimed that the
Defendant had misrepresented the income of the hotel, that he had represented such income to be $600.00
or $700.00 per month gross, with net profits of from
$100.00 to $150.00 per month. Plaintiff claimed
these representations were false in that the books of
the Defendant showed gross receipts of $400.00 per
month and that the hotel had been operating at a loss
of $75.00 to $90.00 per month. The Plaintiff sought
and obtained in the trial Court an order enjoining
the Defendant from collecting said notes on the
ground of fraud. The Appellate Court, however, reversed the lower court on the ground that the Plaintiff had waived the fraud. In discussing waiver the
Court says on Page 809 :
"Conceding that Mrs. Stovall was induced to
enter into the contract by reason of fraud perpetrated upon her by Tuttle, we think by her
conduct she waived the fraud and could not set
the same up to recover damages against Tuttle
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at the time she filed her petition. With knowledge that the representations were false, she
paid one of the purchase-money notes for
$500.00 on September 5, 1908, and on January
8, 1909, she paid $200.00 on another note due
January 5, 1909, and took from Tuttle a writing signed by him acknowledging receipt of the
$200.00 and agreeing "to indulge her for thirty '
days to pay the balance of the note." With full
kn9wledge of the fraud, and thereafter paying
$200.00, and obtaining from the vendor a writing signed by him agreeing to give her 30 days
within which to pay the balance due on the matured note, she claims she is not due the balance
on this note on account of the fraud of Tuttle
which induced her to sign it. By this conduct
she waived the alleged fraud, and cannot now set
it up to prevent the collection of the note. If she
waived the fraud in regard to the balance due on
this note, she waived it as to all the other notes,
as the alleged fraud related to one note as well as
the other. She seeks to prevent the collection of
the balance due on this note, as well as to prevent
the collection of the other note. When. with
· knowledge that the representations inducing
her to give the notes were false, she induced the
vendor, by paying him $200.00, to agree to give
her more time than she had under the original
contract to pay the balance, she condoned the
fraud. After the discovery of the fraud, she
could not have treated the contr-act as a valid one
and procured favors from the other party with
respect thereto without her conduct being construed as an acquiescence in the contract as made
with the fraud in it. By her conduct in thus
dealing with the opposite party she· recognized
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able against her in its entirety. By making the
payments and obtaining from the other party a
writing w·herein he promised to wait on her for
payments longer than was stipulated in the original contract, she made an admission that the
contract w·as valid, which is inconsistent with
her statements that it vvas tainted with fraud.
She impliedly promised to pay the balance of the
note at the expiration of the 30 days, and she
distinctly recognized her liability on the note,
which is inconsistent with the idea that she was
not liable for such balance because of fraud in
the procurement of the note forming part of the
contract. If she did not expect to pay it, she
should not have dealt with it as if she did owe it,
and should not have procured the other party to
agree to something not in the original contract
and induced him to believe that she did not consider that there was any fraud in the contract,
or, if there was that she would make no defense
to the collection on that ground. To do this, and
then avoid payment of the balance of the note,
would be a fraud on the. other party, and one
fraud will not justify another fraud. Her payment of $200, and the obtaining from the other
party a writing wherein he promised to give her
time beyond that provided for in the original contract, was in contradiction of her purpose to sue
for damages for fraud in the procurement of the
notes; and, if there was fraud in the contract,
this conduct was an adoption of it as it existed
with the fraud in it. By her conduct she condoned the fraud, and, like the ratification of the unauthorized acts of an agent, such conduct relates
to the time of the formation of the contract, confirming it from its date and purging it of its
fraud."
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A recent Federal case followed this line of authority is Phillips Petroleum Company, vs. Rau Construction Company, 130 Fed. 2d 499,502. The following statement is made by the Court:
"The authorities are unanimous in holding
that where one has been induced by fraud to
enter into a contract, and after discovery of the
fraud enters into an agreement concerning the
subject matter of the contract, or demands and
receives from the other party any substantial
concession in respect to the contract, he is conclusively deemed to have waived any claim for
damages on account of fraud. Josten Manufacturing Company, vs. Medical Arts Building Company, 8 Cir. 73Fed. 2d 259; International .Harvester Company, vs. Rieke, 8 Cir. 9 Fed. 2d 776;
Schagun, vs. Scott Manufacturing Company, 8
Cir, 162 Fed. 209; State Ex Rei Cary, vs.
Trimble, Mo. Sup. 43 S. W. 2d 1050; Holcomb &
H. Manufacturing Co. vs. Jones, 102 Okla. 175,
228 Pac. 968; Minneapolis~ Moline Company, vs.
Gatzki, Tex. Civ. App., 57 S. W. 2d 593; Thompson, vs. Pitts, Tex. Civ. App. 2 S. W. 2d 899."
In an annotation on this subject at 106 A. L. R.
172, at page 177, the author says:
"In the ordinary case where the seller grants
an extension of time within which the buyer may
pay for property, and the buyer, whether with or
without the giving of renewal notes, or any notes
at all, accepts such extension with knowledge of
the seller's antecedent fraud in the transaction,
it is held that the buyer waives all claim to damages for such fraud."
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Some of the cases herein set forth are cited in support ·
of that statement. The author of the annotation also
says on page 173 :
"It is the general rule that if one induced by
:q1isrepresentations or fraud to purchase, or to
enter into a contract for the purchase of, property, thereafter, with knowledge of the deception, receives from the seller some substantial
consession or enters into a new contract in respect of the transaction, he thereby relinquishes
all right to recover or recoup damages because
of the misrepresentations."
·
This proposition is am ply supported by au thorities from many jurisdictions.
The record in this case shows that after Respondents had been in possession of the property for about
a year and knew of the alleged fraud they became in
default in their payments on the contract, were about
to lose the property and a notice of eviction had been
served upon them. With the matter in such a status
they requested the right to reinstate the contract by
bringing the delinquent payments up to date by paying $100.00 per week. It is undisputed that after such
request was made Respondents raised a sum in excess
of $1600.00 w~ich was tendered to Appellants, and
accepted by Appellants, and the contract was reinstated by Appellants. It is of interest to note that the
Respondents were represented by counsel at the time
and the reinstatement of the contract was handled by
the attorney for Respondents. It is also significant
that the record shows no complaint of fraud having
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been made either by Respondents or their attorney
prior to, during these negotiations or thereafter until
they were sued. Under the authorities cited above
the Respondents have waived any alleged fraud. Reinstatement of the contract is a stronger circumstance indcating waiver than merely obtaining an
extension of time, and in any event falls well within
the doctrine of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer and the other
cases cited.
It is recognized that waiver is an affirmative
defense, that it was not pleaded and that no motion,
was made to amend the pleadings to set up the waiver.
However, Appellants contend that under Rule 15 (b), _
waiver is an issue now before this Court. The pertinent portion of the rule reads as follows:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues."
It has already been pointed out that the evidence
of waiver was admitted without objection and in fact
most of it was brought out by counsel for Respondents. This being true Respondents are deemed to
have consented to introduction of the issue of waiver
in this case. Globe Liquor Co. vs. San Roman, C. C. A.
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7th, 1947, 160 F 2d 800. eontinental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, vs. Ehrhart, C. C. A.
6th, 1942, 127 F. 2d 341.
Under the above rule Appellants contend the issue is now before this Court without amendment.
This rule has been construed in the Federal Courts.
In the case of Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, vs.
Hamond Realty Co., C. C. A. 7th, 1942, 130 F. 2d 993,
certiorari denied 63 S. Ct. 666, 318 U. S. 765, 87 L.
Ed. 1136, it was held that on appeal the pleadings
would be deemed amended to meet the proof. The
Court in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. vs. Rhine, C. C. A. 5th
1945, 152 F. 2d 368, ~eld that on appeal evidence rather than pleading would be regarded. Likewise it
was held in Katz Drug Co. vs. Katz, D. C. Mo. 1950, .
89 F. Supp. 528, that the issue of laches though not
pleaded would be treated as if properly raised where
evidence in the record clearly established such a defense.
However, if the Court believes that an amendment should be made Appellants request that they be
permitted to do so. An amedment can be made after
the case has reached the appellate court. In Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, vs. Siraco, C. C. A.
2d 174 Fed. 2d 360, the Court remanded the case with
instructions to allow the reply to be amended to permit plea of payment and to permit the depositor to
put in answering pro~f.
The evidence of waiver is undisputed and came
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able thereto clearly establishes that Respondents have
waived the fraud complaint of. Therefore the judgment of the trail Court should be reversed and judgment for no cause of action be entered on Respondents' Counter Claim.
CONCLUSION
Appellants recoginze that Respondents testified as to the alleged representations. Such testi.mony was vigorously denied by Appellants in the
trial, and Appellants now maintain that no -such representations were made by them. In any event, Appellants contend in this appeal that such representations were not relied upon by Respondents. Likewise
Appellants contend that Respondents have failed to
prove any damage by reason of the representations
claimed, and finally Appellants maintain Respondents have waived any action for the fraud claimed.
Therefore Judgment of the trial Court should be reversed and the Counter Claim of Respondents should
be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
PERRIS S. JENSEN
GLEN Y. RICHARDS
HAROLD R. BOYER
OF ROMNEY, BOYER~ BERTOCH
Attorneys for Appellants
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